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Abstract
Background: There is increasing concern that conflicts of interest affect the development
process of clinical practice guidelines. We evaluated The American Psychiatric Association's
Practice Guideline for the Treatment of Patients with Major Depressive Disorder to determine
the existence and examine the possible effects of financial and intellectual conflicts of interest.
We selected this guideline because of its influence on clinical practice and because this guideline
recommends pharmacotherapy for all levels of depression, despite controversies over the
evidence base.
Methods and Findings: We determined the number and type of financial conflicts of interest for
members of the guideline development group as well as for the independent panel charged with
mitigating any effect of these conflicts. We also quantified the potential for intellectual conflicts
of interest. We examined the quality of references used to support recommendations, as well as
the degree of congruence between the research results and the recommendations. Fewer than half
(44.4%) of the studies supporting the recommendations met criteria for high quality. Over onethird (34.2%) of the cited research did not study outpatients with major depressive disorder, and
17.2% did not measure clinically relevant results. One-fifth (19.7%) of the reference were not
congruent with the recommendations. Financial ties to industry were disclosed by all members
(100%) of the guideline development committee with members reporting a mean 20.5
relationships (range 9-33). The majority of the committee participated on pharmaceutical
companies’ speakers bureaus. Members of the independent panel that reviewed the guidelines for
bias had undeclared financial relationships. As a marker of intellectual conflict of interest, 9.1%
of all cited research and 13% of references supporting the recommendations were co-authored by
the six guideline developers.
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Conclusions: The prevalence of conflicts of interest among panel members was high. The
quality of the evidence cited raises questions about the validity of the recommendations.
Attention to the quality of cited studies and to the risk of bias resulting from conflicts of interest
should be a priority for guideline development groups.
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Introduction
Clinical practice guidelines are intended to enhance the practice of evidence-based
medicine by streamlining healthcare delivery and improving the process and outcomes of patient
care. However, there is increasing concern about the quality of guidelines, particularly those
produced by professional organizations and medical specialty groups [1-16]. The most obvious
quality issue is that limitations of current methodology affect guideline development; the science
of developing recommendations for clinical practice based on the best available evidence
continues to evolve [1,17-19].
However, financial conflicts of interest (COI) and intellectual bias can also influence
recommendations, especially those from professional advocacy groups (Table 1) [5,6,8,20-25].
Financial conflicts of interest occur when individuals or the profession they represent have the
potential to receive financial gain from a recommendation. An intellectual conflict of interest
exists when adherence to a specific point of view "could unduly affect an individual's judgment
about a specific recommendation" [4]. Frequently, intellectual conflicts of interest arise from
academic activities or interests on the part of guideline developers that create the potential for
confirmatory bias [26]. Although it is difficult to quantify or qualify intellectual conflicts of
interest, guidelines produced by specialty societies are particularly vulnerable to bias resulting
from these conflicts [26]. Biases form financial and/or intellectual conflicts of interest may
result because such conflicts may affect decision-making in a way that is completely hidden
from the person making the decision [28]. Recent neuroscience investigations demonstrate that
effective decision-making involves not just cognitive centers but also emotional areas such as the
hippocampus and amygdala [29]. This interplay of cognitive –emotional processing allows
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conflicts of interest to affect decision-making in a way that is completely hidden from the person
making the decision.
Although increased attention has been given to improving the guideline development
process [30-32], these tools have not resulted in marked improvement in the development of
guidelines by specialty societies [5,6,11,12,30,33,34]. Improvement is needed because guidelines
produced by specialty groups run the risk of overestimating benefit and underestimating harm
[27]. In previous papers we expressed our concern about the guideline development process used
by the American Psychiatric Association (APA) and the recommendation of pharmacotherapy as
a first-line intervention for all levels of depression despite controversies over the evidence base
[11,12,34]. Specifically, antidepressant medication and psychotherapy are identified in APA’s
most recent CPG as appropriate “monotherapies” for mild to moderate depression. However, the
prominence of pharmacotherapy in the Executive Summary, the “Recommended Modalities for
Treatment” Table, and in the clarification section of the guideline, clearly gives pharmacotherapy
precedence over other therapies [12].
We have developed an approach to guideline evaluation that incorporates checks for
conflicts of interest as well as evidentiary threats to the validity of the recommendations. The
objectives of this study were to assess the quality of the cited evidence in APA’s Practice
Guideline for the Treatment of Patients with Major Depressive Disorder, third edition [35] to
document the prevalence of conflicts of interest, and to examine the effect of conflicts of interest
on the recommendations in this CPG.
Methods
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We examined guidelines developed by a work group of experts drawn from the APA’s
membership. The guideline development process employed by the work group included a
literature review, but the method of literature search, evaluation, and interpretation was not
described in the guidelines. Guideline developers were not prohibited from industry relationships
but were required to disclose all conflicts of interest. In response to a recommendation from the
Institute of Medicine [20] that guideline work groups should have no significant relationships
with industry, the Association added an independent review committee consisting of clinicians
and researchers without declared conflicts of interest to assure the recommendations were not
affected by industry influence. The final draft of the guideline was reviewed by this independent
panel, whose members declared that they had “no current relationships with industry.” The
Independent Review Panel “found no evidence of bias” ([35] p.11). No information was
provided regarding the assessment and decision-making process for the Independent Review
Panel’s conclusion.
The guideline begins with an executive summary followed by a section, “Formulation
and Implementation of a Treatment Plan” (Part A.II), which provides explication and includes
supporting references. The method of searching and selecting articles for inclusion is not
described. In the reference list, each reference is ranked from [A], “randomized double-blind
clinical trial,” to [G], “other, including textbooks, expert opinion, and case reports.” Systematic
reviews are given a rank of [E] in this rubric. The third section of the document, “Review and
Synthesis of Available Evidence” (Part B.V), provides clarification and support for the
recommendations and summarizes the literature review used by the guideline developers.
Recommendations for treatment are stated in general terms and vary across the different
sections in wording, tone, and emphasis. To link recommendation statements to the supporting
6

evidence, we coalesced treatment guidelines from the three sections into 12 single statements.
We have described our method of synthesis in a previous publication [12].
To determine the number and type of financial conflicts of interest for members of the
guideline development group, we tallied the reported pecuniary ties of all guideline developers.
Undisclosed financial relationships of the independent review panels were tallied for the 3 years
prior to publication of the guideline, a process congruent with other research [11,36] and
consistent with APA’s definition of a financial conflict of interest (see e.g., DSM5.org). We
searched Medline and Lexis-Nexis Academic for publications in which financial ties with
industry were disclosed by the oversight committee members. We also searched the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office internet site for patents pending or awarded to determine whether
members had any intellectual property in a drug or medical device whose sales could be affected
by practice guideline recommendations. Internet search engines were used to access other
reliable disclosures (e.g., author disclosures provided at peer-reviewed conferences). Consistent
with previous research [12, 37] only unambiguous information previously and directly reported
by the independent review panel within the three year time period was included.
Following Norris et al. [21], intellectual bias was determined by documenting the number
of publications that were authored by the guideline development committee and cited as
evidence for a specific recommendation and by determining whether only content experts (i.e.,
psychiatrists) were represented on the guideline development committee.
To evaluate the potential impact of conflicts of interest on the use of evidence, references
linked to the recommendations in part A.II and in the evidence report (Part B.V) were retrieved
and assessed for major threats to internal and external validity (Table 2) [13,16,38]. These
criteria correspond to Grade A evidence using the Canadian Hypertension Evaluation Program
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rubric [39] and Strength of Recommendation Taxonomy grade A [40,41], and are similar to
internal and external validity assessment of the USPSTF [41]. Each cited reference was
independently evaluated using these criteria by two researchers (DRE and AFS). Differences
were resolved through discussion.
Results
All members of the guideline development committee and the oversight committee were
U.S.-based psychiatrists and were members of the APA. Financial ties to industry were disclosed
by all members (100%) of the guideline development committee (Table 3), with members
reporting a mean 20.5 relationships (range 9-33).
One member of the independent review panel had undeclared financial relationships to
pharmaceutical manufacturers of antidepressants in the three years before the publication of the
guidelines, including receiving honoraria and consulting fees. Two other members had financial
relationships with pharmaceutical companies, but we were unable to ascertain if these were in
existence between 2007-2010 (i.e., within the designated three year time period). These ties
included speakers bureau participation, research funding and consulting fees. We obtained this
information from public disclosures previously made by these members. All of the financial ties
of the guideline committee and review panel were with pharmaceutical companies that
manufacture antidepressants. Current disclosure policies do not require disclosure of the amount
of money given to an individual by industry; thus, consistent with previous research [36], it was
not possible to determine the amount of industry money received by any individual. However, it
has been well documented that even small gifts can influence physician behaviour and
prescribing practices [43,44].
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The 12 synthesized recommendations were supported by 130 references. We included
128 (98.5%) of these references in our analysis; two Cochrane Reviews had been withdrawn by
the time of this study and were not available for analysis. It is the policy of the Cochrane Library
to withdraw reviews if a more recent revision is available or emerging evidence that contradicts
the review’s conclusions demands a retraction. Agreement for quality determination was high
(kappa = .8381, 95% CI .7481 to .9344).
Fewer than half of the studies (n = 44, 34.4%) used to support the guidelines met all 5
criteria for high quality (Table 4). Thirty-two percent of the references investigating treatment
were not randomized controlled trials, a priori subgroup analyses, or systematic reviews with a
thorough search. Clinically relevant results were not measured in 17.2% of the citations. About
one-third (34.2%) of cited research did not study outpatients with major depressive disorder, but
instead enrolled patients with dysthymia, inpatients, or mixed inpatient/outpatients. Seventeen
(13%) of the 130 articles supporting the recommendations were published by one of the
guideline developers. Most of these articles were research, reviews, or editorials involving a
pharmaceutical. Of these 17 studies, 82% (14/17) were cited as evidence in the guideline for
efficacy, safety or favorable risk/benefit ratio of antidepressants. Citations used to support the
recommendations did so 80.3% of the time; for the rest, the reference did not apply or the data
from the study disagreed with the recommendation.
For example, two well-publicized meta-analyses independently concluded that because
of a lack of efficacy antidepressant medication should not be the first line intervention for mild to
moderate depression [12,45]. Noting a benefit only for the most severely depressed patients,
Fournier et al. concluded that, “True drug effects (an advantage of [antidepressant medications]
over placebo) were nonexistent to negligible among depressed patients with mild, moderate, and
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even severe baseline symptoms…. [E]fforts should be made to clarify to clinicians and
prospective patients that whereas [antidepressant medications] can have a substantial effect with
more severe depressions, there is little evidence to suggest that they produce specific
pharmacological benefit for the majority of patients with less severe acute depressions” ([46] pp.
51-52).
Kirsch et al. reported similar findings: “Drug–placebo differences increased as a function
of initial severity, rising from virtually no difference at moderate levels of initial depression to a
relatively small difference for patients with very severe depression, reaching conventional
criteria for clinical significance only for patients at the upper end of the very severely depressed
category” ([45] p. 260).
However, the results from these meta-analyses are interpreted in this way in the
guideline: “Response rates in clinical trials typically range from 50-75% of patients, with some
evidence suggesting greater efficacy relative to placebo in individuals with severe depressive
symptoms as compared to those with mild to moderate symptoms” ([35] p.31). This statement,
and the identification of antidepressants as a first-line intervention for mild to moderate
depression, is not congruent with the research because it suggests that medication is effective for
all levels of depression. The language used in the guideline and the recommendation of
medication for all severity levels obscures the main finding of both meta-analyses:
Antidepressants were found to be effective only for the most severely depressed patients and thus
should not be a first line intervention for patients who are mildly or even moderately depressed.
Discussion
In this analysis of the American Psychiatric Association’s Practice Guideline for the
Treatment of Patients with Major Depressive Disorder, we identified the presence of possible
10

bias introduced by financial and intellectual conflicts of interest. The evidence base cited for the
recommendations often did not meet basic criteria for quality and sometimes did not support the
recommendations.
Financial relationships with pharmaceutical companies were common among all
guideline developers and were present in some members of the oversight committee who were
supposed to be free from financial conflicts. The majority of the guideline authors served on
speakers bureaus as did at least one member of the independent review panel. Speakers bureau
participation is usually prohibited elsewhere (e.g., for faculty in medical schools), as it is widely
recognized to constitute a significant financial conflict of interest. Pharmaceutical companies
refer to individuals who serve on speakers bureaus as ‘‘key opinion leaders’’ because they are
seen as essential to the marketing of diseases as well as drugs. The Institute of Medicine
recommendations suggest that, “whenever possible,” guideline developers avoid a financial
conflict of interest, and, at minimum, those with a conflict represent a minority of the
development group. They explicitly ban the guideline chair from having financial ties [30].
Although it has been argued that it is not feasible to find experts without industry ties, it has been
shown that content experts without financial conflicts of interest are available to serve on
guideline development committees [47].
The impact of financial relationships recommendations has been well documented
[22,23,48-50]. Recent guidelines from the National Heart Lung and Blood Institute
recommending lipid screening of approximately 40% of the children in the United States has
been called, “evidence of a broken process,” because of extensive ties between the expert panel
and the pharmaceutical industry [50]. A United States professional society was the subject of a
legal investigation; in the settlement, a state Attorney General noted important financial conflicts
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of interest and suppression of scientific evidence that had tainted the guideline development
process [22,23]. A similar court ruling occurred in France, resulting in the withdrawal of two
guidelines from the French Health Authority following charges that chairpersons of both
working groups had “major” financial conflicts of interest [49]. In contrast, other guideline
developers face stricter precautions against bias arising from conflicts of interest. The United
Kingdom’s National Institute for Health and Clinical Evidence have instituted more rigorous
safeguards and procedures, and personnel at the National Collaborating Centres must have no
personal financial conflicts of interest [51,52].
Groups that have greater safeguards in place to prevent conflicts tend to produce
guidelines that differ substantially from this depression guideline. For example, the National
Institute on Health and Clinical Excellence addresses the risk/benefit issue regarding the primacy
of pharmacotherapy and explicitly states that antidepressant medication should not be the first
line choice for individuals with mild depression [53]. Recent Dutch guidelines recommend
antidepressants as first-line treatment only in cases of severe depression [54].
There is a well-documented evidence base for the efficacy of non-pharmacological
interventions in the treatment of mild to moderate depression, particularly for exercise [55,56]
and psychotherapy [57,58]. Both NICE and the recent Dutch guidelines use this evidence to
support their recommendations for nonpharmacologic therapies as first line alternatives to
pharmacological treatments [53,59]. It is possible that the guideline development group for this
CPG was concerned about certain populations not having access to non-drug interventions (e.g.,
fewer psychotherapists in rural areas). However, the recommendation for antidepressant use for
all levels of depression is made for all populations ([35] see e.g., Figure 1, p. 31) regardless of
access.
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These guidelines also are at risk of an intellectual conflict of interest, in that all guideline
work group members were from the same profession, were active researchers in the
pharmacological treatment of depression, and were members of the professional society
developing and promoting the guidelines. Although content expertise is needed, it is increasingly
recognized that for CPGs to be valid and trustworthy, a mix of content experts and
methodologists is warranted [30]. For example, while it is important that the panel members
considered all types of evidence, from case reports that are categorized as “low quality” to “high
quality” RCTs, the finding that 34% of the cited RCT research did not study outpatients with
major depressive disorder and over 17% did not measure clinically relevant outcomes provides
further support that methodologists without intellectual or financial conflicts of interest need to
be part of all guideline development groups.
It has been suggested that professional societies may not be able to provide unbiased
guidance. As mentioned in a recent editorial, “. . . Although it is true that individual medical
providers care deeply about their patients, the guild of health care professionals — including
their specialty societies — has a primary responsibility to promote its members' interests. . . . But
it is a fool's dream to expect the guild of any service industry to harness its self-interest and to act
according to beneficence alone — to compete on true value when the opportunity to inflate
perceived value is readily available” ([60], p. 1078). This is a critical point, especially in light of
the fact that this guideline has enormous influence—approximately 80% of all prescriptions for
ADs are written by non-psychiatrists [61]— and this guideline is the trusted resource to which
many physicians and nurse practitioners turn.
Other researchers have noted the effect of intellectual conflicts of interest on guideline
results [4-6,8,21,23,49]. In an evaluation of guidelines for screening mammography, Norris and
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colleagues found that the substance of guideline recommendations was related to the number of
recent publications of guideline developers [21]. A consensus statement from three United
States endocrinology societies rejected recommendations from the scientific review they
commissioned [62] because, “In the opinion of our panel members, the consensus conference
recommendations in the areas delineated above are contrary to the practice of many, although not
all, experts . . .” ([63], p. 582). Similarly, subsequent guidelines from the American Academy of
Pediatrics [64] and the American College of Radiology contradict guidelines of the United States
Preventive Services Task Force regarding the management of kernicterus [65] and screening for
breast cancer [66].
It should be emphasized that a CPG author’s mere association with industry is not meant
to imply that that inevitably he/she will make interpretations that favor industry. Financial ties
between industry and academic researchers bring attention to the generic risk that the guideline
development process may be compromised. Moreover, most people with conflicts of interest—
from physicians [67] to U.S. Supreme Court Justices [68]—do not recognize the effect of these
conflicts on their judgments [28]. Declaring or acknowledging conflicts does not mitigate their
effects. As previously noted, both social science and neuroscience literature demonstrate that
transparency alone is an insufficient solution because bias is often implicit and unintentional.
In fact, disclosure may not only normalize conflicts of interest but may also worsen bias.
For example, “moral licensing” occurs when disclosure of a conflict of interest reduces feelings
of guilt of the advisor, resulting in more biased advice because advisees “have been warned” [6971]. In practice, moral licensing occurs as experts in a field acquire numerous financial or
intellectual relationships with pharmaceutical industry, allowing them and frequently their
audience to rationalize that the relationships somehow “cancel out” one another. Such
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findings have critical implications for clinical experts charged with developing diagnostic and
practice guidelines; disclosure of their industry relationships may make them more favourable to
pharmacological products [72].
There are several limitations to our study. We had to synthesize recommendations from
the guideline by comparing statements presented in several sections of the guideline. Other
researchers may have synthesized the recommendations in a slightly different way since subtle
differences in wording can affect the interpretation of recommendations [73,74]. Also, because
the general statements in the executive summary (Part A) are not linked to the evidence, we may
not have identified all of the citations used in the process that shaped the guidelines. Our criteria
for determining quality should be considered de minimus and we may have failed to identify low
quality research used to support recommendations. Additionally, our measures of intellectual
conflicts of interest (previously cited studies and membership in specialty societies) have
limitations. However, these measures have been identified as important areas to explore in order
to understand the effect of intellectual COI on guideline development [26]. Although these
results do not point to a direct causal relationship between financial or intellectual conflicts of
interest and guideline quality, our findings contribute to the growing body of data on the effects
of these conflicts on clinical practice guidelines.
It was beyond the scope of this study to replicate the literature search conducted by the
GDG, conduct a systematic review of all of the literature on pharmacological and nonpharmacological interventions, and identify high quality studies that were omitted from the
guideline. However, future research should try to determine if there are a significant number of
omitted studies in guidelines produced by specialty groups.
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Despite these limitations, our method of evaluation of these guidelines can be used to
provide a more thorough assessment of practice guidelines. It builds on the criteria developed by
McAlister [16] by adding checks for financial and intellectual conflicts of interest as well as
criteria recommended by the Institute of Medicine [30]. Our approach offers advantages over
another instrument developed to evaluate practice guidelines. The AGREE II instrument aims to
identify higher quality guidelines through the use of a 23-item tool evaluating six quality related
domains. Each item has a 7-point Likert-like response scale [75]. However, its focus is on the
evaluation of the guideline development process and reporting. It does not evaluate conflicts of
interest except to address the composition of the guideline development group and to determine
whether conflicts of interest have been “recorded and addressed.” Its scoring system does not
provide a cut-off to distinguish low-quality from high-quality guidelines. Also, it does not weigh
the relative effect of the quality indicators on guideline quality, e.g., the criterion, “the views of
the funding body have not influenced the content of the guideline,” is given no more weight than,
“a procedure for updating the guideline is provided.” As a result, the AGREE II criteria are better
suited as a blueprint for guideline developers rather than an evaluation tool for potential users of
a guideline.
Guideline development has matured to the point where all guidelines are typically
labelled as being “evidence-based.” However, what should be a straight line from the current
best evidence to guidelines for clinical practice is more akin to a tortuous path and that is why
individual authors and groups have worried that guideline quality has declined rather than
improved over time [20,30,76 ,77]. Because clinical interpretations of medical evidence will
differ [78] it is critical that users of CPGs and patients be aware that conflicts of interest may
exert undue influence on these interpretations [79, 80]. Therefore, we suggest that when specialty
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groups with strong industry ties produce CPGs, users should read closely the disclosure
statements of the authors and consider “how [COI] may have influenced recommendations”
([21], p.e25153).
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Table 1. Steps in guideline development susceptible to methodology flaws or conflicts of
interest.

1. Framing: Viewpoint and underlying assumptions*†
2. The questions that are asked*†‡
3. Data gathering and selection*†‡
4. Data evaluation*‡
5. Data interpretation
a. Internal validity*‡
b. External validity*†
6. Judgments of data (results of research vs. conclusions)*†
7. Lack of explicit evidence-linking with resulting evidence “slippage”†‡
8. Lack of testing or external validation of guidelines (verification)‡

*
†
‡

Financial conflict of interest
Intellectual conflict of interest
Methodology flaw
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9. Table 2. Criteria for high quality research.*
Study design: Studies of effectiveness: Randomized controlled trial of any quality, a
priori subgroup analysis of a randomized controlled trial, systematic review, or metaanalysis. Systematic reviews and meta-analyses had to include a comprehensive search
(and not, for example, including only company-sponsored research). Study results had to
be statistically significant or, if a negative study, of adequate power. Studies of
tolerability or overdose: Randomized controlled trials or observational studies of
withdrawal rates or withdrawals due to side effects.
Study populations representative of a clinical population: Outpatients with
diagnostic criteria for major depressive disorder. Studies were excluded if they studied
patients with dysthymia or bipolar disorder, used unspecified criteria for diagnosing
major depressive disorder, or if the majority of patients were not treated as outpatients.
Clinically important outcomes: At least one: Hamilton Depression Rating Scale,
Montgomery-Åsberg Depression Rating Scale, maintenance of depression. For
tolerability studies, withdrawals or withdrawals due to side effects. For studies of
overdose: significant clinical effects or completed suicide rate.
Results: Statistically significant results or, if a negative study, adequate study power;
For meta-analysis, no heterogeneity mentioned.

*

Adapted from reference 40.
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Table 3. Financial relationships disclosed by guideline developers.
Guideline

Pharmaceutical

Medical Device

Developer

Company

Company

Relationships

Relationships

*
†
‡

Other*

Speakers

Total

Bureaus†

1 (Chair)

13

2

2

3

17

2

7

0

8

0

15

3

2

0

7

0

9

4

20

1

3

6

24

5

18

1

6

6

25

6

28

2

3

‡
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Publishers or investment consulting groups
These relationships also included as pharmaceutical company relationships
Not listed separately from other relationships with pharmaceutical companies
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Table 4. Percent of citations supporting the recommendations meeting quality criteria.
Criteria
Studies meeting all 4 quality

Percent High Quality
34.4

criteria
Randomized controlled trial or

68.0

systematic review
Representative study

65.6

population
Clinically important outcome

82.8

measured
Statistically significant results

57.8
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